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Given the possibility of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza arriving in North America and monitoring programs that have
been established to detect and track it, we review intercontinental movements of birds. We divided 157 bird species showing
regular intercontinental movements into four groups based on patterns of movement—one of these groups (breed Holarctic,
winter Eurasia) fits well with the design of the monitoring programs (i.e., western Alaska), but the other groups have quite
different movement patterns, which would suggest the importance of H5N1 monitoring along the Pacific, Atlantic, and Gulf
coasts of North America.
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INTRODUCTION
Flu viruses have long been known to circulate in birds [1], which
led to intensive studies of avian influenzas in the middle twentieth
century [2,3]. The emergence of a highly pathogenic influenza A
strain H5N1 in the past several years—beginning in Southeast
Asia and now spreading into Africa, the Middle East, and Europe
[1,4–9]—has brought this issue again to the forefront of global
attention. The fear is a global influenza pandemic—this highly
pathogenic H5N1 strain (hereafter referred to as ‘‘HP-H5N1’’) is
associated with human case fatality rates reportedly higher than in
the 1918 ‘‘Spanish’’ flu pandemic, and lacks only the ability to be
transmitted efficiently among humans [10–12].
HP-H5N1, however, is for the moment, at least, an avian
phenomenon—that is, although it is dangerous to humans once
they are infected, HP-H5N1 is a bird disease transmitted among
birds. If, at some point, HP-H5N1 evolves efficient human-to-
human transmissability, then human movements and connectivity
will govern the spread of the virus [13]. Until that time, however,
HP-H5N1 is being dispersed by birds, be they wild or domestic.
Although the issue of the relative importance of the two has seen
considerable debate [14–19], and will clearly see considerably
more debate still, we present herein a series of forecasts of likely
HP-H5N1 geographic behavior regarding entry into North
America if dispersal were to be driven by migratory birds.
HP-H5N1 spread
HP-H5N1 was first isolated in 1996 from a farm goose in
Guangdong Province, People’s Republic of China [20]. It was
then detected in domestic poultry and humans in Hong Kong in
1997. After a silent period, HP-H5N1 reappeared in quick
succession in Thailand (Dec. 2003), Republic of Korea (Dec.
2003), Vietnam (Jan. 2004), Japan (Jan. 2004), Thailand (Jan.
2004), Cambodia (Jan. 2004), Laos People’s Democratic Republic
(Jan. 2004), Indonesia (Feb. 2004), and People’s Republic of China
(Feb. 2004). The next set of appearances began with records in
People’s Republic of China, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam in
June and July of 2004, and then in Malaysia (Aug. 2004).
After somewhat of a pause late in 2004, interesting events began
to occur. A large outbreak (6000+ birds dying) occurred at
Qinghai Lake in central China (Apr. 2005), as well as in poultry in
Xinjiang Autonomous Region, western China (Jun. 2005), both
well to the northwest of previous detections. In quick succession,
outbreaks then occurred in western Siberia (Russia, Jul. 2005),
Kazakhstan (Aug. 2005), Tibet (Aug. 2005), and Mongolia (Aug.
2005). Finally, late in 2005, HP-H5N1 appeared in Turkey,
Romania, Taiwan, and Croatia (all in Oct. 2005), and later (late
2005–early 2006) in Cyprus, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq. As
of April 2006, the virus had been detected across almost all of
Europe, in numerous southern Asian countries, as well as in 5
African countries (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Egypt, Nigeria,
Niger), and by October 2006 the list had expanded to include
Sudan, Ivory Coast, and others.
To summarize, from an initial southeastern appearance in Asia,
HP-H5N1 spread up the Pacific coast as far as Japan and Korea.
It later jumped northward into central Asia, and then appeared to
the southwest in the Middle East, Europe, and Africa. These
‘‘jumps’’ have lead many to expect increasingly rapid spread,
perhaps even globally, in coming years. In reality, though, we
suspect that the apparently extremely rapid spread in recent years is
most likely a reflection of establishment of surveillance programs—
the virus had already spread to most of the areas listed above prior
to initiation of surveillance efforts.
That wild birds are an important long-term evolutionary source
reservoir of influenza A viruses is in little doubt [1]. However, for
HP-H5N1 in particular, the pattern of spread has been variably
interpreted as reflecting involvement of wild birds [21–23] or not
being at all consistent with wild bird movements [14,15,17,24].
The basic argument revolves around the relative weights of evid-
ence including where the virus has and has not been documented
to occur, and whether the virus circulates among healthy wild
birds. In this contribution, however, we reconstruct likely HP-
H5N1 geographic points of entry from Eurasia and Africa into
North America under the supposition that wild birds are involved,
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summarizing migratory patterns of 157 bird species that have
distributional areas in both hemispheres.
RESULTS
In all, we could divide the 157 species more or less concretely into
4 groups (lists provided in Appendix S1). The traditional group
considered in the context of HP-H5N1 were the 14 species that
winter in Eurasia, but that breed across the Holarctic (i.e., crossing
into the Western Hemisphere at least marginally; Fig. 1). These
species winter across West and Central Africa, and South and
Southeast Asia, and thus coincide in winter with the now-
established HP-H5N1 foci in those regions. The Western Hemi-
sphere portion of the breeding distributions of these species is
focused in western Alaska, but 3 species breed on the western rim
of Greenland and in eastern Canada (Charadrius hiaticula, Motacilla
alba, Oenanthe oenanthe).
In contrast, however, 10 species breed across both hemispheres
in the Holarctic, but winter at least in largest part in the Americas
(Fig. 2). The Eurasian portion of the breeding range of these
species is mostly along the Arctic rim, but at least one species (Larus
ridibundus) ranges considerably farther south in Russia, extending
to areas that have indeed seen HP-H5N1 outbreaks (Fig. 2). These
species winter in diverse parts of the Americas, but are focused
along the Pacific, Atlantic, and Gulf coastlines of North America
(Fig. 2); one species (Tryngites subruficollis; not shown) winters in
southern South America.
A much larger suite of species (56) is pelagic in nature,
particularly in winter. These species breed across the North
Atlantic and North Pacific, and extend farther south in coastal and
offshore areas in winter (Fig. 3). Finally, 76 species have distribu-
tional areas in both regions in both seasons (Appendix S1)—as
such, without more detailed data regarding connectivity of specific
subsets of species’ distributional areas (i.e., do any intercontinental
movements take place among these species?), we cannot establish
the degree to which intercontinental movements are or are not
taking place.
Figure 1. Species that winter in Eurasia, but that breed across the Holarctic (including North America). The top 2 panels present examples of single
species (Phylloscopus borealis, Charadrius hiaticula; green=breeding distribution, blue =wintering distribution), whereas the lower 2 panels show
species richness patterns of this set of species (see Appendix S1) in winter (white = 0, darkest shade= 8 species) and in the breeding season (white = 0,
darkest shade= 11 species), with color ramp indicating number of species.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000261.g001
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DISCUSSION
In the paragraphs and figures above, we have explored how HP-
H5N1 might arrive in North America as it spreads across Eurasia
and Africa. Perhaps given the potential importance of these issues,
however, several points have been controversial, and will be
mentioned here.
First is the supposition that migratory birds are involved in
regional dispersal of HP-H5N1. Some have argued that much or
all of the geographic patterns of spread of HP-H5N1 is under-
standable based on legal or illegal movements of poultry [15].
Others have observed genetic connections among virus strains in
areas connected by bird migration [16], or have tracked the
general pattern of spread [21–23], and have arrived at the
opposite conclusion—that migratory bird movements have been
intimately involved in HP-H5N1 spread. We do not intend to
solve this debate here—that question will clearly require extensive
sampling and testing large numbers of wild birds for resolution—
rather, we present scenarios of likely geographic behavior of HP-
H5N1 were migratory birds to be a major dispersal vector.
An additional consideration is the host taxonomic distribution of
HP-H5N1 infections. An almost universal dogma is that this virus
infects waterfowl principally [1,22,23]. Clearly, as waterfowl are of
large body size and tend to congregate in aquatic environments in
large numbers, opportunities for transmission from individual to
individual are great, and their aquatic habits apparently serve to
increase the probabilities of cross-infection. In this sense, waterfowl
represent a logical focus of influenza infection.
However, given the urgency of the situation, the waterfowl focus
of HP-H5N1 must be considered critically so as to avoid incorrect
assumptions. Detection biases are certainly involved; for instance,
a small songbird dead in a forest is much less noticeable than
a large, sick or dead waterbird; current surveillance programs, in
fact, are focusing entirely on the waterbirds (see below). Second,
Figure 2. Species that breed across both hemispheres in the Holarctic, but winter at least in part in the Americas; one species (Larus ridibundus)
ranges considerably farther south in Russia, extending to areas that have indeed seen HP-H5N1 outbreaks; these species winter in diverse parts of the
Americas, but are focused along the Pacific, Atlantic, and Gulf coastlines of North America. The top 2 panels present examples of single species
(Limnodromus scolopaceus, Larus ridibundus), whereas the lower 2 panels show species richness patterns of this set of species (see Appendix S1) in
winter and in the breeding season, with color ramp indicating number of species (white = 0, darkest shade= 5 species).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000261.g002
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the very limited data sets that are available and that present data
for other than waterbirds [25] seem not to show any bias towards
waterfowl and against landbirds. Finally, in studies at HP-H5N1
outbreak sites, land birds have been found to be infected with the
virus. For example, an Oriental Magpie-Robin (Copsychus saularis)
found dead in Hong Kong tested positive for H5N1 [26],
suggesting that land birds do become infected, although their
actual role in dispersal and spread of HP-H5N1 remains to be
tested carefully. As such, the conclusion that waterfowl alone are
the hosts of HP-H5N1 [cf. a recent review [1]] should probably be
reexamined in the face of new, objective evidence. This role,
whether it be large or small, does not change the conclusions of
this study; rather, it only would reweight the roles of different
species in HP-H5N1 dispersal and spread, but the basic patterns
remain the same.
The point of this discussion is that of reexamining the present
HP-H5N1 surveillance network that has been established in North
America in light of connectivity via bird migration among the
northern continents. Basically, the question distills to whether the
U.S. government is looking in the right places to find HP-H5N1
when or if it does arrive in North America. The National HPAI
Early Detection System (HEDDS) has been established to monitor
for the entry of this virus into North America, and a parallel
system has been established in Canada [27]. The spatial distribu-
tion of samples tested as part of HEDDS in 2006 and its rather
extreme focus on Alaska are shown in Fig. 4 (2005 sampling was
parallel, if not still more concentrated in Alaska) [28]. Taking into
account the Canadian sampling programs [27], the Arctic rim is
better represented [27], but the coastal zones farther south remain
relatively unsampled.
In the present analysis, we have shown that one component
(birds breeding in North America and Eurasia and wintering in
southern Eurasia or Africa) of the intercontinental migratory
avifauna fits the Alaskan focus of the HEDDS surveillance. The
remainder of the bird species that cross between continents,
however, do not fit this mold. Rather, they have the potential to
carry HP-H5N1 to the extreme northeastern rim of North
America and/or farther down into North America (and even into
South America), well south and east of Alaska. What is more, the
primary focus of these distributional areas is coastal—Pacific,
Atlantic, and even Gulf. These areas should be considered as
additional—and potentially key—foci for HP-H5N1 monitoring.
More generally, this analysis points out the need for actions in
response to key policy issues to be based firmly on quantitative
biology and detailed analysis, rather than simply on opinion. That
is, plans for HP-H5N1 early detection and monitoring should not
be based on tradition and dogma (e.g., waterfowl only), but on
detailed scientific preanalysis that uses the best information
available in the moment to make the best decisions possible. This
analysis is just a small step in that direction—other work necessary
should address migratory patterns within North America, and
should involve extensive testing of wild birds from HP-H5N1
infected areas to establish much more firmly the geographic,
ecological, and host-taxonomic distribution of this virus.
METHODS
We reviewed summaries of species’ distributions and seasonal
movements in the most authoritative resource for North America
[29]. We chose, in all, 157 species (both landbirds and waterbirds)
that have seasonal distributions in both the Palearctic (i.e., Eurasia)
and the Nearctic (North America) regions. We followed the AOU
taxonomy [29], except for a few cases in which other resources
[30] present updates and modifications.
We then digitized breeding and wintering ranges for each
species (see Appendix S1, for a list) as polygon shapefiles in
ArcGIS 9.0, based on range descriptions in recent summaries [29–
31]; where AOU range descriptions differed with respect to
Eurasian breeding status from other sources (e.g., Tringytes subrufi-
collis, Calidris bairdii), we followed the Eurasian-specific literature
resources [31]. We omitted species that do not breed or winter
regularly in the Americas (e.g., Philomachus pugnax, Calidris ferrugi-
nea), although they do provide a regular influx of vagrant
individuals. Species were then separated into groups of more or
less comparable seasonal movements: [1] breeding in North
America and Eurasia and wintering in southern Eurasia or Africa,
[2] breeding in North America and Eurasia and wintering in the
Americas, [3] breeding in North America and Eurasia and
wintering pelagically, and [4] Holarctic, with breeding and
wintering grounds in both hemispheres but no clear interconti-
nental movements. One species, Larus glaucescens, did not fit well
into this schema, as it breeds in northwestern North America and
winters along the Pacific coasts of both continents. Counts and
Figure 3. Species that are pelagic much of the year, particularly in
winter. These species breed across the North Atlantic, North Pacific, and
Arctic, but extend farther south in coastal and offshore areas in winter.
Distributional limits for each species are shown as a black outline.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000261.g003
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manipulations of species in these four classes formed the basis for
all our analyses.
SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Appendix S1 Summary of species included in the analysis
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000261.s001 (0.03 MB
DOC)
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